The recent U.S. operation against Venezuela can be understood as an illustrative case of an asymmetric counter to the gray-zone tactics long employed by China—namely legal ambiguity, actions below the threshold of armed conflict, and fait accompli strategies. In this instance, the United States effectively lowered the threshold for the use of force, while simultaneously maximizing legal justification, thereby raising the threshold for retaliation by adversaries.

A particularly important element of this operation was its design to be minimal in scale and extremely short in duration. By limiting physical damage and preventing the expansion of the conflict, completing the operation before international public opinion could fully consolidate, and imposing high political and legal costs on any potential retaliation, the United States was able to relatively reduce the risk of sustained international criticism. In this sense, the logic previously employed by Russia in Crimea and by China in the construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea appears to have been applied in reverse by the United States.

This approach can be described as a hybrid strategy, one that reconfigures existing deterrence theories—deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial—together with escalation management, within a gray-zone context. Such an approach was likely feasible precisely because it was undertaken by the Trump administration, whose governing style prioritized outcomes over norms and was supported by a domestic political structure more tolerant of international criticism. For these reasons, it would be difficult for other states to replicate this approach independently.

However, if key allies such as Japan and the United Kingdom tacitly acquiesce to U.S. operations of this kind, such hybrid strategies may increasingly become a viable option for the United States and its network of allies and partners, functioning as a new form of deterrence.

At the same time, there is a significant risk that China or Russia may seek to emulate similar actions, potentially triggering new forms of escalation. It is therefore essential, from both diplomatic and academic perspectives, to clearly demonstrate that the conditions under which such operations can be considered successful are highly limited.

China, while condemning the U.S. intervention as a violation of international law, has responded not through military means but by accelerating de-dollarization efforts, including proposals for renminbi-denominated credit lines to Venezuela. This response suggests the possibility of counterproductive effects, indicating that the ultimate evaluation of the operation may shift depending on how these broader economic and geopolitical dynamics unfold.

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References

RUBIO: This Is Our Hemisphere — and President Trump Will Not Allow Our Security to be Threatened – The White House
https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2026/01/rubio-this-is-our-hemisphere-and-president-trump-will-not-allow-our-security-to-be-threatened/

National Security Strategy of the United States of America | November 2025
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

2026 United States strikes in Venezuela – Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_strikes_in_Venezuela

Eurasia Group | The Donroe Doctrine: Eurasia Group’s #3 Top Risk of 2026
https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/risk-3-the-donroe-doctrine

Trump’s ‘Donroe Doctrine’ seeks influence over Western Hemisphere citing old US policy – ABC News
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trumps-donroe-doctrine-seeks-influence-western-hemisphere-citing/story?id=128926397